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Abstract
We analyze the effect of communicating distorted signals by interdependent agents who hold different levels of trust and
make repeated decisions, independently and simultaneously, and who learn from each other. We found that in a
duopoly model differential levels of misrepresentation and trust of firms have notable and non-trivial effects on
profitability. With asymmetric misrepresentation, when the firms have both 1st and 2nd order trust, we find that the firm
that misrepresents more gains more, whereas when the firms have 2nd order trust but no 1st order trust, the firm that
misrepresents less gains more. We also discuss the effects of firms having different combinations of trust levels. Finally,
we conclude with implications and limitations of our findings.
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ABSTRACT 
We analyze the effect of communicating distorted signals by interdependent agents who hold 
different levels of trust and make repeated decisions, independently and simultaneously, and who 
learn from each other. We found that in a duopoly model differential levels of misrepresentation 
and trust of firms have notable and non-trivial effects on profitability. With asymmetric 
misrepresentation, when the firms have both 1st and 2nd order trust, we find that the firm that 
misrepresents more gains more, whereas when the firms have 2nd order trust but no 1st order 
trust, the firm that misrepresents less gains more. We also discuss the effects of firms having 
different combinations of trust levels. Finally, we conclude with implications and limitations of 
our findings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Signaling in competitive environments usually involves misrepresentation or deception of 
some form to gain strategic advantage (Crawford, 2003; Heil & Robertson, 1991). The benefits 
to misrepresenting strategic variables, such as costs, depend on the extent to which a signal is 
distorted by the sender and on the type and level of trust formed by the receiver. The level of 
trust determines the extent to which a distorted, or misrepresented, signal is considered credible. 
In this study, we analyze the effect of communicating distorted signals by interdependent agents 
who hold different levels of trust.  
 
This paper aims to answer the question of how misrepresentation and trust jointly 
influences profitability. To develop new theory, we study scenarios in which agents undertake 
repeated interdependent actions or decisions. These agents signal ex ante about their planned 
actions, but cannot verify their opponents’ misrepresentations of such signals ex post. These 
scenarios arise when the interacting agents’ actions depend on their opponents’ private 
information, and there are possible strategic benefits to misrepresenting such information. This 
problem is quite common as indicated by the study of misrepresentation in contract law.   
 
We study a particular version of this problem that is present in oligopolistic settings. The 
agents can either trust the communicated signals that their opponents provide, or they can learn 
from observing the actual behavior of their opponents. A common occurrence of such a scenario 
is when competing firms decide on their planned optimal production quantities by 
communicating their respective private production costs via cost signals. They can either believe 
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those signals or learn from each others’ observable quantities, which defines their future 
competitive strategies and hence profitability. 
 
To study the effect of misrepresentation, we first describe a scenario for unverifiable 
misrepresentation and trust, which involves learning from each other. We then describe a model, 
representing this scenario, of an industry, in which firms signal their costs, learn and infer their 
competitors’ costs through repeated interactions, and make decisions about their production 
quantities based on the learned beliefs.  
 
LITERATURE 
While the literature on signaling is fairly limited in strategy research (e.g. Balachander 
and Srinivasan, 1994; Heil & Robertson, 1991; Srinivasan, 1991), there is long line of literature 
in economics where agents or firms communicate even when they compete against each other, in 
order to obtain mutual benefits. The most popular topic of these studies deals with Oligopolists 
sharing private information with their rivals. The information involved in the communication can 
be either firm specific, such as its costs (Gal-Or, 1986; Li, 1985; Shapiro, 1986), or is common to 
all firms, such as market demand, but possessed only by a subset of them (Gal-Or, 1985; Kirby, 
1988; Novshek & Sonnenschein, 1982; Vives, 1984), or a combination of both (Amir, Jin, & 
Troege, 2010; Raith, 1996). 
 
Misrepresentation of private information in strategic communication, the main topic of 
this study, is analyzed in several different strands in literature. Within the realm of general 
communication models in economics, the classical and prominent study of Crawford and Sobel 
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(1982) analyzes a model of noisy signaling when the preferences of sender and receiver differ. In 
game theory, misrepresentation is studied mainly in the context of signaling via cheap talk. 
Farrell (1993) analyzed private communication in zero-sum games, and a survey of the related 
theory is provided by Crawford (1998) and Farrell and Rabin (1996). While game theory is 
mostly filled with studies that deal with equilibrium analysis, studies that undertake non-
equilibrium or finite-time analysis which have greater practical implications are relatively few. 
Farrell (1988) and Rabin (1994) attempted to study non-equilibrium analysis in games with 
preplay communication via cheap talk and whose players have substantial common interests, 
while Costa-Gomes (2002) attempted to interpret experimental data in such games. Industrial 
organization is another strand in which misrepresentation is studied within competitive contexts. 
Ziv (1993) analyzed truthful information sharing in oligopoly, and showed that if firms have the 
ability to mislead, they usually do. Milgrom and Roberts (1982a) analyzed misrepresentation via 
limit pricing, and showed that if an incumbent has private information about costs, then limit 
pricing can arise in equilibrium. Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982b) 
studied reputational misrepresentation, though in a weak form. It occurs when firms undertake 
actions intentionally to form a false reputation to deter entry, only to capitalize on it later on. In 
terms of competitive strategies, Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) showed that firms under-invest and 
prefer to look “lean and hungry” with respect to certain capabilities and over-invest in predatory 
capabilities. 
 
Similar to the mentioned signaling or communication literature, the literature on trust is 
vast, with several proposed definitions of it. Sztompka (1999) defined trust as the expectation 
that an opponent will act in ways conducive to our well-being, while Rousseau (1998) defined 
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trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intensions or behavior of another”. Here, in this study, we are 
concerned with cognition-based trust which is based on individual thinking about and trust in the 
other. In this context, Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) proposed two dimensions of trust: 
benevolence – an affective component, and competence – a cognitive component. For trust in 
interdependent relationships, Zand (1972) is one of the few who proposed an interactive model. 
 
If competing firms make repeated interdependent decisions, two things happen: firms 
form belief models of other firms, and they learn from each others’ decisions. Stahl and Wilson 
(1995) analyzed experimentally player’s models of other players, and proposed boundedly 
rational classifications based on these models. Interdependence of competitive decisions is 
studied by Lenox, Rockart, and Lewin (2006, 2007), while learning behavior, reinforcement or 
incremental, is formalized by Sutton and Barto (1998), Camerer and Teck-Hua (1999), and Erev 
and Roth (1998). Levinthal (1997) proposed a model for learning in a setting where policy 
choices are interdependent. 
 
While the literature mentioned above analyzes misrepresentation in several different 
settings, very little has been done to analyze misrepresentation along with trust in competitive 
scenarios that involve learning. Hence, in this study, we formally model and analyze the effect of 
communicating misrepresented private information in different trust settings in scenarios where 
firms make repeated interdependent decisions independently and simultaneously and learn from 
each other. This approach allows us to add to prior literature by addressing the question of how 
misrepresentation and trust jointly influences profitability.    
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A MODEL OF UNVERIFIABLE MISREPRESENTATION AND TRUST 
Consider an industry with two firms in an oligopolistic setting. The firms produce non-
differentiated products but have access to different production technologies, and as a result, they 
differ in their production costs; otherwise they are identical. The production cost is private 
information to the firms and is not readily known to their competitors. Each firm signals or 
announces its associated production cost to its competitor, who then forms belief of its own 
depending on its level of trust of the focal firm. Since the signals are unverifiable (by 
assumption) and there are possible benefits to misrepresentation, firms may or may not reveal 
their true cost depending on their strategic objectives. It is important to note that the 
misrepresented behavior and trust attributes of the firms are not common knowledge. 
 
The firms engage in repeated competitive interactions over multiple periods. In each 
period, the firms compete against each other by deciding upon the quantities to be produced 
according to the Cournot oligopoly model. We use the Cournot model to capture period-to-
period firm-level competitive interactions because it is commonly used for this purpose, both in 
the literature on industry organization and in models of industry evolution (Postrel, 1991; 
Knudsen, Levinthal & Winter, 2014). The agents make their decisions or strategies based on 
their common knowledge of the market demand, their own realized cost of production, and their 
belief of opponent’s cost. 
  
In each interaction in each period, each firm not only makes decisions about its own 
quantities, but also estimates how much its competitor should produce based on the information 
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available to it at the time. In order to do that, it needs to take into account its belief of its 
competitor’s belief about its cost – in other words, its competitor’s belief of its cost from its 
perspective. At the end of the period, each of the firms will observe a noisy variation of the 
quantity produced by its competitor, and updates its belief depending on the level of trust about 
its competitor. The update can happen to its belief of its competitor’s cost (1st order belief) or to 
its belief of the belief of the competitor about its cost (2nd order belief). The revised beliefs are 
used to compute new quantities (strategies) in the next period. In this way, the two firms learn 
from each other and adjust their beliefs about their opponents’ apparent costs.  These cost 
estimates are then used to compute their respective output quantities and profits. 
 
A particular feature of this scenario is that, if the estimated competitor’s quantity differs 
from the observed one, a firm can’t differentiate whether its competitor has misrepresented its 
cost signal, or did not believe in the focal firm’s signal – we refer to this situation as 
unverifiable misrepresentation. 
 
THE MODEL 
We model and analyze the scenario described above with a 2-stage repeated game. As 
mentioned, the two firms in the industry produce non-differentiated products, i.e. products that 
are homogenous and perfectly substitutable. The ith firm,   , has constant true marginal 
production cost ci, which is known only to the firm, i.e. it is private information to the firm.  
 
The inverse market demand is defined as 
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 	 A B CD       (1) 
 
where p is the market clearing price, a>0 and b>0 are the intercept and slope, respectively, of 
the linear demand equation, and Q is the total quantity produced. Note that a and b is known to 
both firms. 
 
To start with, the firms announce their costs via signals to their opponents, given by EF 
and E for firm i & j respectively. Unlike some studies in the literature, the signals we deal with 
are well defined, noiseless, costless, and non-binding. Since the firms tend to act strategically, 
this can result in the possibility of misrepresenting these signals. They then undertake repetitive 
competitive interactions, each interaction in two stages. 
 
In the first stage, in each period, the firms make decisions (strategies) independently and 
simultaneously about the quantities of the product to be produced. The firms compute these 
quantities according to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The decisions are strategic in the sense 
that they maximize each firm’s profit given its opponent’s production quantity. Thus the quantity 
is a function of both a firm’s own cost of production as well as its belief of its opponent’s (in 
addition to the market demand parameters). Let the belief of firm i about firm j’s cost in period t 
beF . Then its quantity decision qit in that period is given by 
 
F 	 A B F  F C     (2) 
 
where F is the true marginal cost.  
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In addition to computing its own quantities, firm i also estimates that its competitor (firm 
j) should produce a quantity given by 
 
 	 A B F  F
FC      (3) 
 
where F
F
 is the firm j’s belief of firm i’s cost from the perspective of firm i.  
 
For brevity, we refer to F  as firm i’s 1st order belief, and FF as its 2nd order belief. 
 
In the second stage, in each period, the firms, after trading in the market, learn from each 
other and update their beliefs, 1st order or 2nd order (since the market demand is common 
knowledge), again independently and simultaneously. We define a firm’s trust as its 
unwillingness or reluctance to learn or update its belief from its opponent’s signal. Assume that 
the firms cannot observe their opponents’ quantities accurately, but with a probabilistic deviation 
given by   !", where ! is the variance of the deviation. Then firm i observes its 
opponent’s (firm j’s) quantity  at the end of period t and updates its belief of opponent’s cost 
for the period t+1 as 
 
#$"F 	 %  &F'F()*+,#-,".*+,/   B &
F'F()*+,#-,"0*+,/  ()*+,#-,"1*+,/2 
F

  (4) 
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where  3 'F 3  is the rate of learning or updating of firm i, and &F is the trust parameter for 
F . &F indicates whether or not firm i blindly trusts firm j’s cost signals, i.e. &F=0 when there is 
trust (i.e. when beliefs are not updated); else &F =1 when there is no trust 1. That is, trust is the 
situation where a firm believes the cost signal that the opponent provides.  In that situation, the 
belief of the opponent's cost level is held constant, i.e.  #$"F 	 F 4 
 
Similarly, firm i updates its belief of opponent’s (firm j’s) belief of its cost for the period 
t+1 as 
 
F#$"F 	 %  &FF'F()*+,#-,".*+,/   B &F
F'F()*+,#-,"0*+,/  ()*+,#-,"1*+,/2 F
F

  (5) 
 
where &FF is the trust parameter for FF. &FF indicates whether or not firm i trusts that firm j 
believes its (firm i’s) cost signals, i.e. &FF=0 when there is trust (i.e. when beliefs are not 
updated); else &FF=1 when there is no trust.  
 
Again, for brevity, we refer to &F as firm i’s 1st order trust, and &F
F
 as its 2nd order trust. 
 
Each of the firms’ beliefs are initialized with the respective signals, opponent’s as well as 
its own, in the first period taking into account the existing level of trust. That is, the beliefs of 
firm i in the first period are initialized as 
 
 
1It is unlikely that firm i finds out the true cost cj of firm j since it does not know whether or not firm j trusts its 
signal EF. 
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   $F 	   &F'FE  and  F$
F 	   &F
F'FEF.    
 (6) 
 
This is based on the premise that firms tend to understate their cost when they 
misrepresent (Ziv, 1993). We also assume that the 1st and 2nd order beliefs get updated by the 
same amount, i.e. 'F for firm i. 
 
Since it is a Cournot competition, the quantities jointly produced by the firms determine 
the market clearing price. This price along with the actual (private) production cost and the 
quantity produced will determine the profit to a firm in each period. The period t profit 5F for 
firm i is given by  
 
5F 	  B F"F       (7) 
 
where pt is the market clearing price in period t given by the demand equation, and ci is its true 
production cost. Note that the profit depends on the values of true costs, (misrepresented) 
signals, and beliefs. 
 
SIMULATION 
A simulation is carried out to analyze the marginal effect of misrepresentation of cost 
signals issued by firms under different trust settings on their asymptotic profits in repeated 
competitive environments. We run the simulation with N=500 pairs of firms for T=200 periods. 
The true marginal production cost of the firms are set at c1=1.0 (low cost firm) and c2=2.0 (high 
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cost firm) respectively. The market demand parameters are fixed at a=10 and b=1. The learning 
rates of the firms are set at '$ 	 '6 	  4. The cost signals issued by the firms are varied to 
analyze their marginal effect, and the outputs measured are the firms’ average profits over time.  
 
A misrepresentation, denoted by F for firm i, is considered as the difference between the 
true cost and the advertised cost. Different combinations of misrepresentations of cost signals for 
the pair of firms are considered in the simulation. If both firms have the same amount and 
direction of misrepresentation, then it is considered a symmetric misrepresentation case; 
otherwise it is an asymmetric misrepresentation case. A firm is said to trust, indicated by the 
binary variable &, its opponent if it blindly believes and does not update the respective cost 
signal. Mutual trust on a cost signal is said to prevail if the two firms trust each other with 
respect to that signal; if one of the firms does not, then asymmetric trust is said to prevail. 
 
RESULTS 
We present the main findings, in our opinion, in the form of propositions and describe the 
possible main mechanisms that underlie or lead to those statements. In order to effectively 
compare and analyze the performance of different combinations of misrepresentations and trust 
settings, we compare each output to a base case, in which the two firms do not misrepresent their 
cost signals and trust each other. 
 
A feature of the model to be noted is that, if there is 1st order mutual trust, then 2nd order 
beliefs don’t influence profits. This follows from eqs. (2) & (3), in which the firms compute their 
quantities based only on their own costs and on their 1st order beliefs of competitors’ costs. Since 
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it is assumed that the signals firms issue remain constant throughout the simulation, and that the 
2nd order beliefs do not influence the signals anytime in the model, these (2nd order) beliefs do 
not affect the quantity decisions, either directly or indirectly, as long as there is 1st order mutual 
trust. 
 
Proposition 1. With asymmetric misrepresentation and with 1st and 2nd order mutual trust, the 
firm which misrepresents more gains more. For the same amount of relative misrepresentation, 
the gain to the high capable (low cost) firm is more than that of the less capable (high cost) firm. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
--------------------------------- 
Insert figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
In Cournot competition, when a firm sends a cost signal that is lower than its true cost, it 
tries to persuade its opponent to produce less quantity to gain more market share and make more 
profit. Therefore, if firms trust each others’ signals and also expect the same from their 
opponents, then the firm which misrepresents more by signaling a much lower cost induces its 
opponent to produce much less and gains more profit. This is evident in fig. 1 in which firm 1 
misrepresents more ($=0.8) and gains more, and in fig. 2 in which firm 2 misrepresents more 
(6=0.8) and gains more, both relative to the base case. 
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Also, if the high capable (low cost) firm misrepresents its cost signal more, by claiming 
to be more cost effective than it actually is, then its opponent will trust this signal and, according 
to eq. 2, will produce even less quantity, which benefits the focal high capable firm more, as 
depicted in fig. 1 in which the low cost firm, firm 1, misrepresents more. On the other hand, if 
the low capable (high cost) firm misrepresents more, it will also successfully induce its opponent 
to produce less, as depicted in fig. 2 in which the low cost firm, firm 2, misrepresents more, but 
the impact in terms of profit differential (wrt. the opponent) won’t be as much as in the case of 
the high capable firm misrepresenting more. The lower cost signal of the former case is much 
more effective for generating profit differential than the cost signal of the latter case. Thus for 
the same asymmetric misrepresentation, the high capable firm gains more by misrepresenting 
than that of the low capable firm. 
 
Proposition 2. With asymmetric misrepresentation and with no 1st order trust but only with 2nd 
order mutual trust, the firm which misrepresents less gains and the firm which misrepresents 
more looses. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
--------------------------------- 
Insert figure 4 about here 
--------------------------------- 
When firms’ don’t trust each others’ cost signals, they form beliefs and modify them 
based on the difference between the estimated and observed production quantities. So, when 
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firms don’t trust each other but expect their opponents to trust them, then the firm which 
misrepresents more causes its opponent to modify its (1st order) belief of the focal firm’s cost 
more, i.e. increase its cost estimate more, in the subsequent period. This pattern gets repeated in 
later periods and results in the opponent producing more and more quantities, and hence more 
profits, relative to the base case. The focal firm also modifies its belief of opponent’s cost 
initially, but because the opponent’s misrepresentation is less, and combined with the fact that 
the opponent produces more quantities in later periods due to the focal firm’s greater 
misrepresentation, the focal firm ends up producing less quantities subsequently, and hence less 
profits, until stability is reached. This is evident in fig. 3 in which greater misrepresentation of 
firm 1 decreases its profits while improving profits for firm 2, and in fig. 4 in which greater 
misrepresentation of firm 2 decreases its profits while improving profits for firm 1, both relative 
to the base case. 
 
Proposition 3. With symmetric misrepresentation and with 1st order asymmetric trust and 2nd 
order mutual trust, the firm which does not trust its opponent gains more by misrepresenting 
than the firm which does. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert figure 5 about here 
--------------------------------- 
--------------------------------- 
Insert figure 6 about here 
--------------------------------- 
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In cases where there is 1st order asymmetric trust and 2nd order mutual trust, the firm 
which trusts its opponent will not modify its beliefs, both 1st and 2nd order, and will keep its 
quantity decision constant throughout. Whereas the firm which does not trust its opponent 
modifies (increases) its 1st order belief based on the feedback, and increases its quantity decision 
in subsequent periods, thereby reducing the market price. If competing firms misrepresent to 
each other by the same amount, then for the trusting firm the price reduction combined with 
constant quantity will reduce its profits, whereas for the non-trusting firm, the price reduction is 
more than compensated by the increase in its quantities, and hence its profit will increase and 
remain more or less constant. This is depicted in fig. 5 in which firm 1 trusts its opponent and 
reduces its profit over time whereas firm 2 does not trust and improves its profits over the base 
case, and in fig. 6 in which firm 2 trusts its opponent and has its profit level close to the base 
case whereas firm 1 does not trust and improves its profits over the base case. 
 
Inline with proposition 1, the gain to the high capable firm which does not trust its 
opponent, firm 2 in fig. 6, is more than that of a less capable firm which does not trust, firm 1 in 
fig. 5. 
 
Proposition 4. With symmetric misrepresentation and with 1st order asymmetric trust, not having 
2nd order mutual trust is better for the firm which trusts its opponent than having 2nd order 
mutual trust. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert figure 7 about here 
--------------------------------- 
A

--------------------------------- 
Insert figure 8 about here 
--------------------------------- 
A firm does not change its quantity decision if it has 1st order trust, whether or not it has 
2nd order trust. However, its opponent who does not have 1st and 2nd order trust will modify both 
beliefs, revising them downward. This results in the opponent producing less and less quantities 
subsequently, thereby decreasing the total market output and increasing the market price. Hence, 
a firm that trusts gains more in profit due to this price increase by not having 2nd order mutual 
trust. Whereas for the firm which does not trust, the net effect of price increase and less quantity 
is a slight decrease in its profit. This is evident in fig. 7 in which firm 1 has trust and gains more 
in profit, and in fig. 8 in which firm 2 has trust and gains more in profit, both relative to the base 
case. 
 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
We developed a duopoly model to study the effect of misrepresentation and trust in a 
competitive setting. We found that differential levels of misrepresentation and trust have notable 
and non-trivial effects on performance. When one firm misrepresents its true cost value more 
than another firm, we say that firms have asymmetric levels of misrepresentation. With 
asymmetric levels of misrepresentation, trust is a fundamental determinant of profitability. Here 
it is important to make a distinction between first and second order trust. 1st order trust is the 
condition that I believe the cost value you report is true.  2nd order trust is the condition that I 
believe, that you believe, the cost value that I report is true. When two firms have asymmetric 
levels of misrepresentation and both have 1st and 2nd order trust, we find that the firm that 
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misrepresents more gains more. This is because the firm that (untruthfully) claims that its cost 
value is lower captures a larger share of the profits. In contrast, when the firms have 2nd order 
trust but no 1st order trust, the firm that misrepresents less gains more. This is because the firm 
that misrepresents less causes its opponent to decrease its estimate of the focal firm’s cost.  The 
opponent will consequently capture a smaller share of the profits.  To complete the analysis, we 
then looked at the corresponding cases where misrepresentation is symmetric and trust is 
asymmetric. Here we found that when there is 1st order asymmetric trust and 2nd order mutual 
trust, the firm that does not trust its opponent gains more.  The explanation is that the firm that 
trusts its opponent will not modify its beliefs (about its opponents costs), and therefore will keep 
its output constant throughout, whereas the firm that does not trust will adjust its opponent’s cost 
upward and captures a larger share of the profits. Finally, when there is 1st order asymmetric 
trust, the firm that trusts the other gains when there is no 2nd order mutual trust. With 2nd order 
mutual trust, the firm that has 1st order trust will never adjust its estimate, whereas the opponent 
gains by adjusting its cost estimate downwards.  However, with no 2nd order mutual trust, the 
opponent's adjustment will be more aggressive, i.e. revise both its 1st and 2nd order beliefs, and 
results in a price increase if it does not have 2nd order trust.  This in turn benefits the trusting 
firm. 
 
We have sketched four cases that provide a fairly complete picture of possible scenarios. 
Our theory is new and the predictions that follow from it may be tested in empirical research. 
The caveat here is that it is difficult to obtain direct measures of trust and misrepresentation. 
Perhaps a more immediate benefit of our analysis is that it provides useful heuristics to think of 
the value of trust and misrepresentation in a competitive setting.  In this regard, our contribution 
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adds to the fairly scant work in strategy and management on signaling (notable exceptions 
include Srinivasan, 1991, and Balachander and Srinivasan, 1994). Our approach also admits 
some limitations. The most important is the simplification that we analyze a duopoly setting. The 
extension to an oligopoly setting with more than two firms is straightforward as regards to the 
extraction of results, but the configuration space obviously increases in the number of firms. 
Even so, our results will hold if considered as statements regarding the firm that has the highest 
levels of misrepresentation or trust relative to the other firms in the industry. Another limitation 
is behavioral plausibility.  As Knudsen et al. (2014), we believe that the Cournot setting provides 
a fairly realistic picture of short-term equilibration, with the long run being a sequence of such 
short run states. That is, we find our model to be a fair compromise between tractability and 
behavioral plausibility.  
 
To conclude, we find that misrepresentation and trust in a competitive setting is an 
exciting and important topic in the study of firm strategies. We have taken a first step towards a 
deeper understanding of how trust and misrepresentation influences profitability. We hope others 
will follow and provide many more.  
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